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In this paper, we analyze pension rate choices for a sample of 495 firms over the thirteen-year 
period from 1994-2006. In recent years, articles have appeared in business publications alleging 
abuse of the discretion afforded to management in setting pension rates, particularly the pension 
discount rate and expected rate of return on plan assets. We find that pension discount rate 
estimates and expected rate of return estimates generally comply with the authoritative 
requirements, although there appears to be a smoothing effect in setting pension discount rates as 
well as a lag in fully reflecting economic conditions. We find evidence consistent with discount 
rate choice being influenced by deteriorating economic conditions, and possibly passage of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We also find that, in general, firms’ expected rate of return assumptions tend 
to reflect their long-run internal rates of return on pension assets, although the recessionary 
influences in the early 2000s were not fully reflected in the expected rates of return toward the end 
of our test period. There is also a sizeable minority of firms (approximately 27%) for which their 
expected rates of return on plan assets consistently overstate their actual, long-run returns. 
 





bout fifteen years ago, several articles alleging a crisis in defined benefit pension plan accounting 
and funding appeared in the popular business press. The articles suggested that aggressive pension 
rate assumptions using overly optimistic rate of return estimates and high discount rates allowed 
firms to manage earnings upward and minimize cash contributions to their plans (see Anders 1992, Pulliam 1993a 
and b, Alster 1993, and Light 1993). Those articles were written in an economic environment of comparatively high, 
but declining, interest rates and stagnating equity markets. 
 
Over the past several years, similar articles have reappeared in the popular business press.  The general 
theme of these articles is that some firms masked poor performance in their core operations throughout the 1990s by 
reporting large amounts of pension income, and this situation would likely reverse in an economic environment 
characterized by low interest rates and modest stock returns.
1
 In general, the authors claimed that many firms were 
setting, or keeping, their actuarial rate assumptions too high, which had the effect of reducing pension liabilities and 
decreasing pension cost. Artificially high rate assumptions, in turn, not only reduced the quality of reported 
earnings, but could lead to dramatic performance declines if firms had to lower them during an economic downturn.  
 
The early 2000s witnessed just such a downturn.  For example, after staying above 7% for most of the 
1990s, Aa corporate bond rates fell to less than 5.0% by mid-2005.
2
 In addition, corporate profits increased from 
                                                 
1 For examples of these sorts of articles, see Solomon and Hawkins (2005), Schultz and Francis (2004), Bulkeley (2002), Krantz 
(2002), Laise (2002), Brown and Weil (2001) and Buffet (2001). 
2 The annual average Corporate Aa rate was 6.23% in 2000 and reached its lowest average in 2005 at 5.35%. Twenty-year 
Treasury bond yields mirrored the decline in corporate rates, only the decline ranged from an annual average of 6.23% in 2000 to 
a low of 4.64% in 2005. Both Corporate and Treasury rates increased in 2006.  
A 
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1994-2000, then fell roughly 35% by 2003 as a result of recessionary pressures.
3
  Even more importantly, stock 
prices fell by nearly 31% between 2000 and 2003, directly reducing pension plan assets.
4
 Given the increased 
pension liabilities attributable to interest rate declines and reduced pension assets due to stock market declines, the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s (PBGC) programs for single-employer plans and multiemployer plans 




Given the deterioration in economic conditions affecting pension assumptions over the first half of this 
decade, as well as the concerns raised by the popular press that pension rates were being maintained at an artificially 
high level, it seems reasonable to undertake a longitudinal, empirical examination of firms’ pension rate choices. If 
firms were systematically overstating their pension rate choices, then the reported rates would appear to be 
significantly different from benchmarks, and changes in rates would lag changes in benchmarks or would fail to 
reflect the magnitudes of changes in benchmarks.  
 
The FASB (2006) underscored the importance of this issue in Statement of Financial Accounting Standard 
(SFAS) No. 158, Employers’ Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans, which 
requires firms to recognize the net funded status –  the fair value of pension plan assets less the projected benefit 
obligation (PBO) – on the balance sheet. SFAS no. 158 also requires gains and losses arising during the period that 
are not already recognized in net periodic pension cost to be recognized as a component of other comprehensive 
income. These gains and losses are attributable, at least in part, to gains and losses arising from changes in pension 
rate estimates. In addition, SFAS 158 stated that the board plans to comprehensively reconsider how to measure an 
employer’s benefit obligation during the second, multi-year phase of its pension project. An important element of 
considering any changes in the measurement of pension liabilities would likely be information on the nature of the 
discount rates currently used to determine liability amounts as well as the nature of management’s compliance in 
setting those rates and expected rates of return with the extant authoritative guidance.  
 
In this paper, we analyze the pension rate estimates used between 1994 and 2006 in accounting for defined 
benefit plans. We compare the rates used by a sample of 495 companies to benchmark rates, in order to ascertain the 
degree of compliance with the guidance provided by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) 87, 106 
and 132R.  
 
In response to the earlier allegations in the business press, Blankley and Swanson (1995) similarly studied 
the pension rate estimates used for a sample of 350 firms between 1987-1993. This paper complements and extends 
Blankley and Swanson (1995) in several ways:  
 
(1) Like that study, we examine pension rate choices in response to allegations of impropriety. The recurrence 
of these allegations motivates an updated empirical evaluation of pension rate choices. In addition, 
significant pension legislation passed in 1994 (the Retirement Protection Act of 1994), which focused 
particular attention on the discount rates used for funding purposes. Whatever influence this legislation may 
have had on pension rate estimates for accounting purposes was not captured in the Blankley and Swanson 
time frame.  
(2) Our research period represents an extended period of declining interest rates. With the exception of three 
years, the yields on high-quality (Aa) corporate bonds declined every year from 1994 to 2006 (except 1996, 
1999, and 2006). By comparison, corporate bond rates declined by close to 300 basis points from the 
lowest point in the Blankley and Swanson time frame. This decline allows us to examine managers’ 
                                                 
3 In our sample, average net income declined from $306.1 million in 2000 to $198.2 million in 2002. By contrast, net income 
increased each year between 1994 and 2000 by an average of 13%. In addition, the percentage of firms reporting losses more 
than doubled from 8% in 1994 to over 20% in 2002. Underscoring the volatility, average net income in our sample increased by 
107% to $410.5 million between 2002-2004, and the percentage of firms reporting losses declined by more than 50% to 9.1% 
over the same period. 
4 In December 1999, the Dow closed at 11,497.12. In February of 2003, its lowest point, the Dow closed at 7,891.08, a decline of 
approximately 31%. In contrast, the Dow grew from 3,978.36 in January 1994 to 11,497.12 in December 1999, growth of 189%. 
5 The PBGC’s single-employer program went from a surplus of approximately $6 billion in 2001 to a deficit of approximately 
$21 billion in 2004, while the multiemployer program went from a surplus of approximately $150 million in 2002 to a deficit of 
over $300 million in 2005. 
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compliance as benchmark rates approach historical lows. A protracted decline in rates may create pressure 
on management to resist lowering pension discount rates beneath an arbitrary “floor.” 
(3) We examine the impact a combined decline in market returns and interest rates has on pension rate choices. 
Between 1994-2006, the market rose to historic levels and then suffered a dramatic downturn, followed by 
a recovery.
6
 The economic downturn created a difficult compliance environment, perhaps the most difficult 
environment since SFAS 87 was adopted. Just as the economy was entering recession, companies faced 
actuarial-driven increases in pension liabilities and pension expense, along with market declines in pension 
assets and returns. The combination threatened reported income and cash flows.
7
 These factors led us to 
investigate whether managers attempted to mitigate the situation by keeping pension rates unrealistically 
high.  
 
We find that the percentage of firms adjusting their rate of return estimates in any year remains relatively 
stable from 1994-2001, ranging from 16% to 20% of our sample. Firms increased their expected rate of return by an 
average of 19 basis points over this eight-year period. This average is surprisingly small, considering that 1994 to 
2001 includes the 1990s market bubble. In contrast, during the 2002 and 2003 market declines, 46.3% and 37.5%, 
respectively, of the sample firms adjusted their expected rates of return. The two-year decrease in average expected 
returns is 56 basis points, which is nearly three times the observed increase during the bubble years (1994-2001). 
Expected rates declined again in 2004, 2005, and 2006 by another 29 basis points, to 8.14%, the lowest point in the 
test period. Even so, the average expected rates in 2002 were higher than the long-run, actual returns earned by 
firms’ pension assets since 1994. Long-run, internal rates of return on pension assets recovered after 2002 and 
remained slightly above average expected returns through 2006. 
 
Any justification for high expected rates of return based solely on historical evidence must be tempered by 
the distinct possibility that returns over the next decade are likely to be lower than those earned between 1994-2006. 
In its 2002 review of Fortune 500 companies, the Securities and Exchange Commission commented on the long-
term expected return assumptions used, and requested that firms provide information about the basis and 
reasonableness of their expected rates of return (SEC 2003).  
 
The percent of firms in our study that changed discount rates during any particular year ranges from a low 
of 61.2% in 1996 to a high of 91.5% in 2004. This represents a marked contrast from the Blankley and Swanson test 
period (1987-1993), where no more than 55.2% of their sample changed rates in any period (except 1993). Frequent 
discount rate adjustments are consistent with the requirements of SFAS 87. Nevertheless, the magnitude of discount 
rate adjustments is nearly always less than corporate bond rate changes, suggesting that managers smooth the impact 
on the financials and pension disclosures. We also find that discount rates are especially “sticky” when corporate 
rates decline. With the exception of one year (2003-2004), we find that the spread between companies’ discount 
rates and corporate benchmark rates increases in every year that corporate rates decline, while the spread declines in 
every year that corporate rates increase. We also find a strong negative correlation in all years between the change in 
corporate rates and the change in spreads between firms’ discount rates and benchmark rates. These results are 
consistent with the notion that managers are less likely to fully reflect the impact of declining rates while more likely 
to fully reflect the impact of increasing rates. Rate declines increase pension liabilities and expense; rate increases 
have the opposite effect. This finding suggests that as corporate rates reached historic lows, managers were reluctant 
to set discount rates that fully reflected benchmark rates. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Examining the DJI from 1987-1993 reveals that the index rose steadily over that time frame, with a 1-year decline of 
approximately 16% during the 1990-91 period. By contrast, the 1994-2000 period saw the index increase from approximately 
4,000 to 11,500, after which there was a 3-year decline of close to 34%. The magnitude and duration of the market’s decline 
between 2000 and 2002 exceeded those in the early 90s, having, we believe, greater potential to affect managers’ pension rate 
choices because of the effect on plan assets.  
7 A quote from Gannet Company’s 2001 10K illustrates the potential cash flow impact: “During 2001, the company’s retirement 
plan assets declined in market value…. As a result of this investment performance, and the use of a lower discount rate to value 
plan liabilities at the end of 2001, total retirement plan obligations grew to exceed plan assets. To reduce this under-funding, the 
company made a $300 million tax-deductible contribution to the plan in December 2001, and may consider making additional 
contributions in 2002.” 
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Finally, with the exception of the 2002 – 2004 period, more firms adjusted their salary progression rates 
each year than adjusted their expected rates of return. The percentage of firms changing their future salary 
expectation ranges from a low of 20% in 2000 to a high of 41.2% in both 1994 & 2002. Firms reduced their 
anticipated future salary increases over the test period from, on average, 5.06% to 4.1% by 2006. Given that the 
PBO and pension expense both decrease with declines in estimated salary rates, the salary decline may be an attempt 
to offset the effect of lower discount rates. Alternatively, the declines may reflect the fact that lower inflation 
expectations influence each rate.   
 
The next section of this paper overviews the guidance in the authoritative literature for choosing pension 
rates. Following that, we discuss our sample selection and data gathering procedures, and provide descriptive 
evidence concerning the discount rate, expected rate of return, and salary progression rate. Next, we provide a more 
in-depth analysis of managers’ discount rate choices and analyze the expected rate of return. We end with a 
summary and some comments about our findings.  
 
AUTHORITATIVE GUIDANCE ON PENSION RATES 
 
 One of the FASB’s objectives in issuing SFAS 87 was to reduce the range of choices for allocating the cost 
of pension benefits across reporting periods. As such, the Board limited the actuarial attribution method allowable 
for expense recognition, settling on a benefits attribution approach, but left discretion over certain assumptions to 
management in order to reflect differing circumstances among firms. In this way, while a single actuarial cost 
attribution method was required, flexibility was allowed so managers could reflect firm-specific circumstances in 
their pension rates. However, the Board did require all rate estimates be best estimates with respect to that particular 
rate. This requirement reflects an explicit approach to determining the rates (paragraph 191); in contrast, in an 
implicit approach, one rate would offset the effect of another rate so that the net result of the combination of rates 
represents a good estimate, but individual rate estimates may not be particularly good estimates. The Board also 
delineated criteria for three rates used in making pension estimates: discount rate, expected rate of return, and 




 In SFAS 87, the Board required that the rate used to discount pension liabilities and determine the service 
cost and interest cost components of pension expense reflect a settlement rate--the rate at which those benefits could 
be effectively settled.
8
 In order to determine appropriate settlement rates, firms may “look to rates of return on high-
quality fixed income investments currently available and expected to be available during the period to maturity of 
the pension benefits” (paragraph 44).  SFAS 106 clarified this notion by identifying as the theoretically preferred 
discount rate the yield on a portfolio of high-quality, zero coupon bonds whose maturity dates and payment amounts 
equal expected cash outflows for the firm’s accumulated postretirement benefit obligation. When zero coupon bonds 
are not used, the discount rates need to incorporate expected reinvestment rates available in the future (paragraph 
186). Conceptually, the rate should reflect the single sum that, if invested at the measurement date, would yield the 
cash necessary to pay the benefits when they become due, or if settlement with a third-party insurer is possible, the 
rate inherent in the amounts at which the obligation could be settled. The Board also noted that discount rates should 
be re-evaluated at each measurement date and, as interest rates rise or decline, discount rates should change in a 
similar manner (paragraph 187).  More recently, in an effort to clarify for firms how to determine appropriate 
discount rates, the SEC pointed to the guidance provided in EITF Topic D-36, which identified a hypothetical 
portfolio of high-quality bonds rated Aa or higher for which the timing and amount of future cash flows approximate 




                                                 
8 A company could settle its benefits by (a) making lump-sum cash payments to plan participants in exchange for their rights to 
receive specified pension benefits, or by (b) purchasing nonparticipating annuity contracts to cover vested benefits (SFAS 87). 
The FASB clarified the notion of “effectively settled” in SFAS. 106 by stating that “effectively settled” considered only the time 
value of money, and not the insurer’s risk inherent in the rate. 
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Expected Rate of Return 
 
 The expected rate of return on plan assets is required to be a long-term rate that reflects the average rate of 
earnings on funds invested to provide for the benefits included in the projected benefit obligation. In estimating this 
rate, management is required to consider both the returns being earned by the plan assets and the rate of return 
expected to be available in the future (SFAS 87, paragraph 46). In other words, the rate is to be a firm-specific blend 
of both past returns and future expectations. There is no requirement that this rate adjust to exogenous interest rates 
(as there is for the discount rate), nor is there any particular guidance for evaluating “future expectations” other than  
that this rate reflects the long-term.  In practice, changes in this rate should be infrequent and moderate, and should 
have a basis in the composition of the pension assets and/or changes in long-term interest rates. In support of this 
basis, Amir & Benartzi (1998) found a weak correlation between the expected returns and asset composition.  
 
SFAS 132R requires companies to disclose the basis for their expected rate of return assumptions. For 
example, the Coca-Cola Company’s 2005 10-K states that the expected rate of return assumption is “based upon … 
target asset allocation and is determined using forward-looking assumptions in the context of historical returns and 
volatilities for each asset class, as well as correlations among asset classes” (Coca-Cola 2005). 
 
Expected Rate of Future Compensation 
 
 The expected rate of future compensation, or salary progression rate, applies only to plans that use future 
salary levels in their pension benefit formula. These firm-specific rates are supposed to represent management’s 
estimate of the actual future compensation levels of the individuals covered by the plan. In determining the rate, 
management should consider future changes due to general price levels, productivity, seniority, promotions, and 
other factors that influence an individual’s compensation. Finally, SFAS 106 notes that all assumptions should be 
consistent to the extent that they include estimates of the same influences, like inflation (SFAS 106, paragraph 33). 
 
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
 To select our sample, we screened Compustat for all firms reporting amounts for discount rates, plan assets, 
and projected benefit obligations.  We then supplemented the Compustat data collected with data from firms’ 10-K 
filings using DirectEdgar and Bloomberg Data Services in order to obtain information that was unavailable, missing 
or incomplete from Compustat (for example, the firms’ actual return on plan assets was missing for most of the 
years before 2000). The final sample includes 495 firms with relatively comprehensive pension data for the test 
period 1994-2006. The number of firms used in any particular analysis differs from 495, depending on the variables 
examined and the year, due to missing data items and the natural attrition of the sample over such an extended time 
period as a result of firm failures and acquisitions. 
 
 Figure 1 (Panel A) charts the average expected rates of return, discount rates, and salary progression rates 
for each year from 1994 through 2004. Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the three rates. One key question 
we considered was how companies adjusted return estimates during the 1990s market bubble and subsequent crash.
 9
 
Between 1994 and 2000, the S&P 500 and Dow indices roughly doubled, while the NASDAQ increased six-fold. 
While the pension expected rate of return trended upward from 1994 to 2000, the total increase over this period was 
only 0.20% (9.00% – 8.80%). During the crash, the mean rate fell by 0.32% in 2002, by an additional 0.53% by 
2006.  The 2006 mean expected return of 8.14% is the lowest level since SFAS 87 became effective. The observable 
declines from 2003 – 2006 were likely influenced by the SEC’s December 2002 public statement that it would 
review expected rates of return higher than 9% if the rate was not clearly justified in the company’s financial report 
(GAO 2004), and reflect increased regulatory scrutiny of the rate. The SEC guidance helps explain the surprising 




                                                 
9 The Dow topped out on January 14, 2000, at 11,722.98. Three months later, on March 10, the NASDAQ index reached its 
apogee: 5,048. Two weeks after that, the S&P 500 hit its bull market high of 1,527.46 (Mahar 2004). 
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Figure 1 
Pension Rate Descriptive Statistics by Year 
 
Panel A: Chart of Mean Pension Rates by Year  
 
Panel B: Pension Rate Descriptive Statistics 
 
Discount Rate 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Mean 8.12 7.39 7.56 7.25 6.84 7.54 7.55 7.24 6.75 6.24 5.88 5.62 5.83 
Min 6 6 6 6 5.5 6 6 5.5 4.75 5 5 4.5 3.63 
Max 9.75 9 8.5 8.3 8 8.5 8.3 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Median 8.25 7.3 7.5 7.25 6.75 7.5 7.5 7.25 6.75 6.25 5.84 5.61 5.85 
Std Dev 0.530 0.405 0.327 0.301 0.319 0.422 0.343 0.290 0.331 0.311 0.254 0.272 0.291 
N 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 496 488 430 426 386 
              
Expected Rate 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Mean 8.8 8.84 8.85 8.92 8.92 8.95 9.00 8.99 8.67 8.43 8.32 8.23 8.14 
Min 6 5 1.025 6 4.5 4.5 4.5 6 5 5 5 2 2 
Max 13 11 11 11.2 11 11 11 11 11 10.4 10 10 10 
Median 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 8.75 8.5 8.5 8.5 8.25 
stdev 0.82 0.81 0.84 0.79 0.86 0.85 0.81 0.79 0.76 0.68 0.64 0.72 0.8 
N 495 495 495 495 494 495 495 495 496 483 452 426 390 
              
Salary Rate 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Mean 5.06 4.84 4.79 4.68 4.58 4.65 4.62 4.51 4.32 4.19 4.13 4.08 4.1 
Min 2.5 2.5 3 1.3 1.5 0 0 0 0 0 -1.28 0 0 
Max 8.5 15 8 8 9 9 9.5 6.5 6.3 6.3 6.125 6 9 
Median 5 5 5 4.75 4.5 4.75 4.5 4.5 4.25 4 4 4 4 
stdev 0.74 0.86 0.69 0.69 0.73 0.72 0.71 0.66 0.66 0.69 0.71 0.72 0.84 
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Figure 1 also shows that the salary progression rate and the discount rate follow a basic downward trend, 
consistent with both rates reflecting declining inflation expectations, but the trend for the discount rate is 
significantly more volatile. In fact, the discount rate is the most volatile of the three rates, reflecting the SFAS 87 
requirement to adjust the rate at each annual measurement date to reflect changes in benchmark rates. Over the 13-
year time period, the average discount rate fell from a high of 8.12% in 1994 to a low of 5.62% in 2005, a downward 
adjustment of 250 basis points.  
 
Table 1 presents information about the frequency and magnitude of rate changes. Panel A indicates that, of 
the three rates, only the discount rate is changed by most firms each year. The percent of firms changing discount 
rates ranges from lows of about 60% to a high of 91.5% in 2004. In fact, over 80% of our sample firms adjusted 
their discount rates in 9 of the 13 years studied. Note that this represents a marked shift from the Blankley and 





Mean Rate Changes 
Panel A: Frequency and Magnitude of Rate Changes 






























94-95 417 85.1% -.724 94 19.2% .036 202 41.2% -.217 
95-96 300 61.2% .166 89 18.2% .007 118 24.1% -.045 
96-97 346 70.6% -.306 89 18.2% .073 132 27.0% -.106 
97-98 410 83.7% -.399 101 20.2% .007 161 32.9% -.099 
98-99 437 89.2% .692 92 18.8% .021 136 27.8% .066 
99-00 305 62.2% .007 79 16.1% .057 98 20.0% -.029 
00-01 402 82.0% -.310 78 15.9% -.019 140 28.6% -.117 
01-02 444 90.6% -.496 227 46.3% -.316 202 41.2% -.179 
02-03 421 87.2% -.510 179 37.5% -.243 145 30.7% -.144 
03-04 388 91.5% -.352 134 30.4% -.099 131 32.0% -.052 
04-05 347 85.7% -.268 110 26.1% -.096 125 31.9% -.045 
05-06 323 85.0% .230 98 25.7% -.097 105 29.7% .031 
Panel B: Number (percent) of Firms Changing Rates by the Frequency of Their Rate Changes Over the 13 Years 








 Num Firms % Firms Num Firms % Firms Num Firms % Firms 
0 2 0.41% 52 10.59% 52 10.59% 
1 1 0.20% 90 18.33% 73 14.87% 
2 7 1.42% 111 22.61% 92 18.74% 
3 2 0.41% 91 18.53% 73 14.87% 
4 7 1.42% 58 11.81% 62 12.63% 
5 10 2.04% 42 8.55% 37 7.54% 
6 29 5.91% 17 3.46% 24 4.89% 
7 33 6.72% 12 2.44% 29 5.91% 
8 61 12.42% 9 1.83% 28 5.70% 
9 74 15.07% 6 1.83% 5 1.02% 
10 99 20.16% 2 0.41% 9 1.83% 
11 100 20.37% 1 0.20% 4 0.81% 
12 66 13.44% 0 0.00% 3 0.61% 
 
 
Panel B of Table 1 provides a distribution of the frequency of firms’ rate changes. For the discount rate, we 
observe at the extremes that two firms (0.41%) did not change their discount rates at all over the ten years studied. 
At the other extreme, 66 firms (13.44%) changed their discount rates every year. And 81.5% of our sample firms 
adjusted discount rates eight or more times across the thirteen years. The data are consistent with greater compliance 
with the FAS 87 requirement to reflect the current interest rate environment at each measurement date.  
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A striking result can be seen when examining the expected rate of return estimates on Panel A of Table 1:  
the number of firms adjusting their expected rate estimates more than doubles in 2001-2002 compared to earlier 
years, and the number of firms adjusting the expected rate in each of the ensuing years is, with one exception, higher 
than in any year prior to 2002. From 1994-2001, the percentage of firms adjusting their expected rates of return 
remains relatively stable, ranging from 15.1% to 20.2% of the sample. In 2002, however, 46.3% of the sample 
adjusted the rate; in every subsequent year, more than 25% of the sample firms adjusted the rate. In spite of the 
increasing rate changes after 2001, there is also evidence that, in general, firms are reluctant to adjust their expected 
rates of return. Panel B of Table 1 indicates that 70% of our sample firms adjusted the estimate three times or less 
during the test period. We will examine the accuracy of the expected rate of return in more detail later. 
 
Examining the direction of expected rate changes is informative as well. Mean rate adjustments from 1994-
2000 were upward ─ firms were consistently raising their expected rate of return estimates during the 1990s market 
increases, although the increases were very small.
10
 Following such small changes, the last five years’ consecutive 
declines represent a relatively large downward adjustment to 8.14% from 9%. The timing of these rate declines 
reflects not only the economic pressure from declining equity markets at the time, but we also suspect that the SEC’s 
stated intention in 2002 to examine expected rate of return assumptions more closely and, in addition, the greater 
regulatory scrutiny generated by the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July 2002, contributed to the increasingly 




Finally, with the exception of 2002-2004, more firms adjusted their salary progression rates each year than 
adjusted their expected rates of return. The percentage of firms changing their future salary rates ranges from a low 
of 20% in 2000 to a high of 41.2% in 1995 & 2002. Since the change in every year except 1999 and 2006 is 
negative, the evidence indicates that firms systematically reduced their future salary expectations over the test 
period. Given that the PBO and pension expense both decrease with declines in estimated salary rates, the salary 
decline may represent an attempt to offset the effect of the discount rate declines. Alternatively, each rate may 
reflect declining inflation expectations. However, Panel B in Table 1 indicates that companies change this rate much 
less frequently than the discount rate. Seventy-two percent of our sample changed the rate four times or less during 
the time period, while only 28% changed it four times or more.  
 
ANALYSIS OF THE DISCOUNT RATE 
 
In order to evaluate firms’ discount rate estimates, we selected benchmark rates based on the guidance 
provided in SFAS 87 and 106. Since it is impossible for us to construct hypothetical portfolios of high-quality, zero 
coupon bonds with maturities matching the dates at which benefits become due, we used the rates available on high-
quality corporate bonds at each company’s pension information date as reported in Compustat. These rates are 
mentioned as appropriate in SFAS 106, and are used by actuaries and auditors in helping them to determine the 
                                                 
10 The mean rate changes presented in Table 1 represent averages across our entire sample. For the expected rate of return and the 
salary rates, they understate the amounts by which rate-changing firms actually raised or lowered their rates because of the 
significant number of observations where the rate changes were zero.  Discount rates are also affected, but less so due to the 
greater number of non-zero observations. The mean rate changes for firms that actually changed rates were as follows:  
  Expected Rate Salary Rate Discount Rate 
1995  .19  -.53  -.85 
1996  .04  -.18   .26 
1997  .40  -.39  -.43 
1998  .04  -.30  -.48 
1999  .11   .24   .78 
2000  .35  -.15   .02 
2001 -.12  -.41  -.38 
2002 -.68  -.43  -.54 
2003 -.65  -.47  -.59 
2004 -.33  -.16  -.37 
2005 -.37  -.14  -.31 
2006 -.38   .10   .23   
11 By “increasingly conservative,” we mean to imply that the rates were conservative relative to earlier rate assumptions, not that 
the rate assumptions were necessarily conservative in an absolute sense.  
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range of acceptable discount rates complying with SFAS 87.
12
 In addition, the SEC has interpreted the requirement 
that firms use a settlement rate to mean that the discount rate should reflect the rates available on high-quality, fixed-
income instruments with Aa ratings or higher, having similar durations to the company’s pension liabilities (Deloitte 
2003). The corporate bond rates we use are the daily rates on 20-year, Aa rated bonds from all industries compiled 
by Moody’s, acquired from Bloomberg data services. 
 
To get a broader perspective, we also use the contemporaneous daily 20-year Treasury bond rates available 
from the Federal Reserve,
13
 as well as the contemporaneous monthly rates published by the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).
14
 The PBGC “provides monthly updates of the interest rates affecting pension 
plans,” and these rates, while considered overly conservative (Blankley and Swanson 1995), are nonetheless 
mentioned in SFAS 87 as a source of possible guidance concerning the discount rate.  While none of the individual 
benchmarks represents the “ideal” benchmark, mainly because they do not incorporate information concerning the 
duration of individual plan liabilities, they do allow us to gauge where companies’ discount rates fall relative to 




Chart of Discount Rates and Benchmark Rates by Year 
 
Panel A: Chart of Rates 
 
                                                 
12 See, for example, the 2003 survey of pension assumptions developed by Deloitte. 
13 It may be argued that 30-year Treasury bond rates are more appropriate, since those are the rates required by the Retirement 
Protection Act of 1994 (RPA 94) to be used in determining pension minimum funding amounts and the Deficit Reduction 
Contributions (DRC). While preferable from this perspective, the Federal government stopped issuing 30-year Treasury bonds in 
February 2002, a critical point in our analysis. Furthermore, 30-year Treasury bonds have a 99.09% correlation with 20-year 
bonds for the time period in our sample, with the 30-year rates always lower than 20-year bonds. Thus, if the 20-year Treasury 
bond rate is a biased estimator, it biases against finding differences between firm discount rates and benchmark rates because 
those differences are smaller.  
14 PBGC rates available on the PBGC’s website only go back to 1996. 
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Panel B: Table of Rates 
 Discount Corp 20 Yr PBGC 
Year Rate Bond Treasuries Rate 
1994 8.12 8.57 7.91 - 
1995 7.39 7.06 6.23 - 
1996 7.56 7.53 6.77 5.00 
1997 7.25 7.05 6.12 4.79 
1998 6.84 6.69 5.47 4.09 
1999 7.54 7.83 6.69 4.57 
2000 7.55 7.49 5.71 5.23 
2001 7.24 7.11 5.75 4.75 
2002 6.75 6.54 4.94 4.33 
2003 6.24 5.99 5.09 3.46 
2004 5.88 5.68 4.88 3.90 
2005 5.62 5.41 4.64 4.00 
2006 5.83 5.73 4.89 5.83 
 
 
Discount Rate Levels 
 
 Figure 2 above (Panels A and B) presents the 1994-2006  mean discount rates along with rates from a high-
quality corporate bond portfolio, the 20-year Treasury bond, and the PBGC. The three benchmark rates do not 
always change in the same direction, but for all years, Treasury rates and PBGC rates are notably lower than 
corporate bond rates. Two observations about the discount rate are important: first, discount rates track most closely 





Analysis of Difference between Corporate Bond Rate and Discount Rate 
Panel A:  Chart of Spread Between Discount Rate and Benchmark Aa Bond Yields 
 
 
 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 
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Panel B: Paired T-Test of Spread between Aa Corporate Rate and Discount Rate 
Year N Mean StdDev T-Stat Pvalue 
1994 490 -0.454 0.547 -18.39 <.0001 
1995 490 0.331 0.477 15.36 <.0001 
1996 490 0.026 0.352 1.66 0.097 
1997 490 0.196 0.350 12.36 <.0001 
1998 490 0.153 0.335 10.12 <.0001 
1999 490 -0.295 0.441 -14.81 <.0001 
2000 490 0.054 0.388 3.09 0.0021 
2001 490 0.126 0.311 8.95 <.0001 
2002 491 0.204 0.369 12.25 <.0001 
2003 483 0.246 0.330 16.41 <.0001 
2004 427 0.204 0.281 15.01 <.0001 
2005 422 0.211 0.319 13.58 <.0001 
2006 382 0.099 0.307 6.33 <.0001 
 
 
 To analyze the relationship between discount rates and corporate bond rates more closely, we graphed the 
spread between these rates in Figure 3, Panel A. The spread between the rates varies considerably over time, 
increasing over seven periods and decreasing over five periods. The spread between mean discount rates and mean 
Aa benchmark rates is the greatest in 2003 at nearly 25 basis points. A paired t-test on the spread between the rates 
for each year, presented in Panel B of Figure 3, indicates that rates are significantly different for each year except for 
1996. In that year, the rates are not different at .05 or less.  
 
Discount Rate Changes 
 
 While relative discount rate levels provide important information, they only tell half the story. It is equally 
important to examine how changes in the discount rate track changes in the benchmark rates. Examining changes in 
the rates has the advantage of mitigating firm-specific maturity differences. The levels may differ based on maturity 
differences, but changes in the rates would be due to exogenous factors.  
 
 Figure 4, Panel A, graphs discount rate changes against corporate bond rate changes. What is clearly 
noticeable is that discount rate changes track corporate bond rate changes, but tend to be smoother than corporate 
bond rate changes, consistent with reflecting management’s desire to smooth out volatility in pension expense and 
liabilities.  In every year but two (1998 and 2004), corporate bond rate changes are larger in magnitude than discount 
rate changes. This result is irrespective of whether the rates increase or decrease. Panel C indicates that rate changes 
are significantly different from each other in all years except 2004 and 2005.  In sum, discount rate changes are 
significantly smaller than corporate bond rate changes in every year except 1998, 2004 and 2005. In 1998, the mean 
discount rate decline was significantly larger than the corporate rate decline, and in 2004 and 2005, the changes in 
rates did not differ significantly from one another. 
 
To determine whether or not most firms were adjusting their discount rates towards the benchmark, which 
was also changing from period to period, we examined the size of the spread between the discount rate and the 
corporate rate benchmark from one year to the next. If the spread between the benchmark rate and the discount rate 
in, say, 2003 was greater than the spread in 2002, then we classified the firm as moving farther away from the 
benchmark rate, which would indicate the firm is taking a less conservative discount rate position. Conversely, if the 
spread between the rates declined, then we classified the firm as moving closer to the benchmark, which represents a 
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Figure 4 
Analysis of Discount Rate Changes and Corporate Bond Rate Changes 
Panel A: Graph of Discount Rate and Aa Corporate Bond Yield Changes 
 
 
Panel B: Mean Rate Changes 
Year DR Chg AA Chg 
1995 -0.724 -1.510 
1996 0.161 0.465 
1997 -0.306 -0.475 
1998 -0.405 -0.362 
1999 0.697 1.144 
2000 0.009 -0.339 
2001 -0.310 -0.382 
2002 -0.492 -0.569 
2003 -0.511 -0.552 
2004 -0.335 -0.310 
2005 -0.268 -0.275 
2006 0.230 0.325 
 
Panel C: Paired T-Test of Differences between Corporate Aa Bond Yield Changes and Discount Rate Changes 
Year N Mean StdDev T-Stat P-Value 
1994-1995 490 0.785 0.719 24.18 <.0001 
1995-1996 490 -0.305 0.401 -16.81 <.0001 
1996-1997 490 0.169 0.341 10.96 <.0001 
1997-1998 490 -0.042 0.366 -2.57 0.0105 
1998-1999 490 -0.448 0.493 -20.11 <.0001 
1999-2000 490 0.349 0.470 16.42 <.0001 
2000-2001 490 0.072 0.265 5.97 <.0001 
2001-2002 490 0.078 0.338 5.13 <.0001 
2002-2003 483 0.041 0.368 2.42 0.0157 
2003-2004 424 -0.018 0.347 -1.07 0.2852 
2004-2005 405 0.001 0.401 0.07 0.946 
2005-2006 380 -0.097 0.381 -4.95 <.0001 
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Table 2 displays the results of the analysis. The table displays the number and percent of firms by year that 
changed their discount rates to increase the spread (decreasing conservatism), decrease the spread (increasing 
conservatism), or keep the spread the same. The table classifies the years according to whether or not the corporate 
rates were increasing or decreasing. In the three periods during which the corporate benchmark rates increased, 
82.21% of firms’ discount rates moved closer to the benchmark rates, indicating an increase in conservatism with 
respect to the discount rates. Since the discount rate is, on average, higher than corporate benchmark rates, these 
firms either increased their discount rates by less than the increase in the corporate benchmark rate or did not change 
their discount rates. The net effect of the observable increase in conservative rate choices in these periods is to lower 
the pension liability and pension expense. In contrast, over the nine periods with decreases in the corporate 
benchmark rate, 55.9% of the firms moved away from the benchmark rate, adopting less conservative discount rates. 
Again, since the discount rate is, on average, higher than corporate rates, these firms decrease their discount rate by 
less than the corresponding decrease in the corporate benchmark rate. In these cases, the net effect of adopting less 




Effect of Increasing and Decreasing Bond Rates on 
Conservatism of Discount Rate Movement Relative to the Corporate Bond Rate Benchmark* 
Corporate Aa Yields Year of Change DR Increases in 
Conservatism 
Distance Remains the 
Same 
DR Decreases in 
Conservatism 
  Number Percent Number Percent Number Percent 
Increasing 1995 – 1996 421 85.74% 3 0.61% 67 13.65% 
 1998 – 1999 396 80.65% 7 1.43% 88 17.92% 
 2005 – 2006 394 80.24% 1 0.20% 96 19.55% 
Increasing Years Average    82.21%  0.75%  17.04% 
        
Decreasing  1994 – 1995 62 12.63% 3 0.61% 426 86.76% 
 1996 – 1997 222 45.21% 0 0.00% 269 54.79% 
 1997 – 1998 233 47.45% 6 1.22% 252 51.32% 
 1999 – 2000 134 27.29% 0 0.00% 357 72.71% 
 2000 – 2001 177 36.05% 1 0.20% 313 63.75% 
 2001 – 2002 441 89.82% 46 9.37% 4 0.81% 
 2002 – 2003 27 5.50% 0 0.00% 464 94.50% 
 2003 – 2004 271 55.19% 9 1.83% 211 42.97% 
 2004 – 2005 225 45.82% 92 18.74% 174 35.44% 
Decreasing Years 
Average 
  40.55%  3.55%  55.9% 
Overall Average   50.97%  2.85%  43.94% 
Avg 1994-2001   47.85%  0.56%  51.78% 
Avg 2002-2006   55.31%  6.03%  38.65% 
* This table compares DR movement relative to changing Aa benchmark classified according to whether the Distance between 
the discount rate and contemporaneous Aa bond yield decreased (increasing conservatism in the discount rate choice), stayed the 
same, or increased (decreasing conservatism).   
 
 
In fact, however, the 2002-2005 period in which corporate benchmark rates declined appears fundamentally 
different than the 1994-2001 periods in which corporate benchmark rates also decline. In every year 1994-2001, a 
majority of firms adjusted their discount rates away from benchmark rates (becoming less conservative each year) 
when the benchmark rates declined. In 2002, however, nearly 90% of the sample firms moved closer to the 
benchmark as those benchmark rates declined (i.e., became more conservative). This is an interesting finding since 
this dramatic repositioning of discount rate choices occurs in the same year during which Sarbanes-Oxley became 
effective. Also interesting is the fact that the situation reverses in the next year. In 2003, only 5.5% of sample firms 
adopted more conservative discount rate choices while 94.5% of sample firms adopted less conservative positions. 
During the next two years, 2004-05, a majority of firms either adopted more conservative positions or maintained 
the same position relative to the corporate benchmark rates. 
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Spread 0 1DRt12AaRate t1,t 3..13Year  
where 
 
DR = Discount Rate 
AaRatet-1,t = Change in Corporate Aa Bond rates from year t-1 to year t 
Spread = (DRt – AaRatet ) – (DRt-1 – AaRatet-1) 
Year = Dummy variables indicating the year from 1996 through 2006 
 
In this model, the variable of interest is the change in the spread between the firm’s discount rate choice in year t-1 
and the contemporaneous Aa corporate bond rate, and the spread in year t. Including the prior year’s discount rate 
captures the “inertia” in the rates, and also controls for management’s relative ability or inability to raise or lower 
the discount rate in the current period. The Aa rate change variable controls for the influence of the direction and 
magnitude of corporate bond rate changes on the spread. The year dummies capture the influence of the time period 
on the change in the spread. 
 
Results from the regression analysis are reported in Table 3, below. The negative and significant coefficient 
on the prior year’s discount rate suggests that the change in the spread is constrained by the earlier discount rate 
choice. The greater the prior year’s discount rate is, the less the spread will change. The negative and significant 
coefficient on the Aa Rate change variable suggests that as the corporate rates increase (decrease), the spreads 
between the discount rate and corporate rate will decrease. This result confirms our previous observation from 
examining the descriptive data above. 
 
Interestingly, while all the year dummies prove significant in the model, the coefficients for 1996 – 2001, 
with the single exception of 1998, are all positive, indicating that spreads were increasing over those years. From 





Regression Results for Rate and Time Period Influences on the Change in 
Observable Spread Between Firms’ Discount Rates and Corporate Rate Benchmarks 
Dep variable= Spread    
Independent Variables Coefficient T-Stat P-Value 
Intercept 4.1514 43.03 <.0001 
DRt-1 -.5999 -53.19 <.0001 
Aa Ratet-1, t -.9962 -54.54 <.0001 
Year96 .4427 10.65 <.0001 
Year97 .0762 2.77 0.0057 
Year98 -.2067 -6.91 <.0001 
Year99 .6461 11.97 <.0001 
Year00 .3827 13.05 <.0001 
Year01 .0686 2.39 0.0169 
Year02 -.2981 -10.87 <.0001 
Year03 -.6117 -20.31 <.0001 
Year04 -.7565 -20.82 <.0001 
Year05 -.8895 -22.64 <.0001 
Year06 -.5614 -11.61 <.0001 
    









Spread  =  (DRt – AaRatet) – (DRt-1 – AaRatet-1) 
DRt-1   = Discount rate at time t 
Aa Ratet, t-1 =  Change in Aa Bond Yields from time t -1 to t 
Yeart  =  Indicator variable for year t, denoted by the subscript 
 
 
 To summarize, the evidence from our analysis shows that discount rates are adjusted frequently as required 
by SFAS 87. Nevertheless, the magnitude of discount rate adjustments is generally less than corporate bond rate 
changes, suggesting that managers smooth out the impact on the financials and pension disclosures. Further, it 
appears that in the early years of this study, discount rates are especially sticky when corporate bond rates decline, 
and less so when rates increase; however, since 2002, firms have moved closer to benchmarks even though 
benchmark rates declined, indicating that discount rates declined by a greater magnitude in these periods than 
corporate rates did. This observation is consistent with firms responding to pressure to reflect benchmark rates more 
fully after keeping rates too high during the recession and interest rate decline in the early 2000s. 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE EXPECTED RATE OF RETURN 
 
 Of the reported pension rates, the expected rate of return has, perhaps, attracted the most attention within 
the popular business press because the rate is relatively easy to understand and to compare to current investment 
returns. When firms show losses on their pension assets, and yet still report expected rates of return at close to 9%, it 
is easy to believe that managers of these firms are using high expected returns to reduce pension expense without 
regard to the quality of the estimate. In other words, management may be taking undue advantage of the smoothing 
mechanisms built into SFAS 87 in order to increase earnings. In fact, Warren Buffett (2001) has suggested that firms 
have irresponsibly kept expected rates of return too high and are likely to face litigation unless they reduce those 
rates. 
 
 SFAS 87 states that the expected rate of return “shall reflect the average rate of earnings expected on the 
funds invested or to be invested,” and that managers, in estimating the rate, should give “appropriate consideration 
... to the returns being earned by the plan assets in the fund and the rates of return expected to be available for 
reinvestment” (SFAS 87, paragraph 45). While management should consider the past returns, they should also 
consider the expected reinvestment rates of return available in the future. 
 
In order to assess the expected return empirically, we compared the rate to two firm-specific benchmarks. 
The first is the simple, unadjusted actual return, calculated as the firm’s actual dollar return divided by the average 















 This rate is unadjusted for firm contributions or benefit payments, or for any of the other items that may 
affect the plan assets during a given year.
15
 While this rate has the advantage of simplicity, it is a short-run return 
calculation, since it captures only the year-to-year returns.  
 
 Our second benchmark is a calculation of the internal rate of return earned on plan assets from 1994 (year t) 
through each period (year t+n). It considers additional cash flows to or from the plan in each period. This measure 
represents the rate of return that sets beginning plan assets equal to ending plan assets for each period, including the 
effect of other cash inflows and outflows. Since each period’s rate represents the rate earned from year t to year t+n, 
                                                 
15 From one year to the next, pension plan assets may be affected by foreign currency translations, acquisitions and divestitures, 
settlements, firm contributions, participant contributions, benefit payments, transfers, and administrative expenses, as well as 
gains or losses. 
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the rate begins to reflect the actual, long-run rate of return earned on plan assets as year t+n moves further away 
from year t. Conceptually, this is the rate that managers might choose as the expected return if they were to have 
perfect information concerning future returns and other cash flows affecting the plan. We calculate the internal rate 
of return as follows: 
 
2 2 .5 2 1.5 2 15.5(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) ... (1 )
2 2 2 2
n n n n
t n t
i i i i




PA  = Fair value of plan assets 
NC  = Net cash flow to the plan, including contributions and benefit payments and any other cash flows 
affecting the plan in any given year 
i  = Internal rate of return 
 
 To determine the internal rate of return (i), we assumed that all cash flows affecting the plan occurred at the 
mid-point of each year. For example, to determine the internal rate of return from 1994–2006, we set ending plan 
assets in 2006 equal to the ending plan assets in 1994 plus or minus the net cash flows occurring each year from 
mid-1995–mid-2006. We then solved equation 2 for i. This rate, then, represents the long-run, actual rate of return 
on plan assets from 1994–2006. 
 
 Figure 5 charts mean expected rates of return against both the simple average actual rate of return and the 
mean internal rate of return. As we noted earlier, the mean expected rate of return appears relatively stable, ranging 
from a peak of 9.00% in 2000 to a low of 8.14% in 2006, a spread of only 86 basis points over 13 years, with all of 
the downward movement occurring since 2000. On the other hand, the average actual rate of return displays much 
more variability, as might be expected of year-to-year returns.  
 
From 1995–1999, the simple, annual returns are quite high, ranging from a high of 16.54% in 1995 to a low 
of 10.94% in 1998. In 2000, the average return was 4.93%, but then drops precipitously to an average loss of over 
5% for both 2001 and 2002, recovering in 2003 with an average return of 10.27% and a return of 10.18% in 2004. 
With the exception of the delining market period, from 2000-2002, the expected rates of return are lower than the 
simple, actual rates of return each year. The 12-period mean of these annual returns is 8.345%, which is consistent 
with the reported expected rates.  
 
While these actual returns are useful in providing a simple benchmark with which to compare expected 
rates of return, they fail to consider the additional cash flows affecting the plans, so they may be inaccurate, 
depending on the nature and magnitude of the additional cash flows. In addition, they represent short-run returns; 
averaging the returns over a long period of time might mitigate this aspect to a certain extent, but even that 
represents a simple, unweighted average.  More recent returns would reflect current asset allocations, so they may be 
more indicative of rates expected to be available for reinvestment. While they may be a more appropriate guide to 
pension expected rates of return than a simple average, determining an appropriate weighting of past returns is 
problematic. There is no theory or conceptual basis to prefer one weighting scheme over another; any weighting 
method applied would necessarily be ad hoc.  
 
 To overcome this problem, we derived the internal rate of return (IRR) for each firm for each period as 
described above, then took the average IRR for our sample and used this as a benchmark with which to compare 
expected rates of return. Figure 5 shows that, in general, the average IRR of pension plan returns has been 
decreasing over the 1995–2003 time period, stable between 2004-05, and slightly increasing from 2005- 2006. The 
range runs from a high of 17.39% in 1995 to a low of 8.01% in 2002. The 1995 IRR represents, however, only a 
one-year return. While a one-year return is a poor proxy for the long-run rate, the IRRs begin to reflect a long-run 
return as we move farther from 1995, which suggests that the decline in rates we observe  is really a progression to a 
long-run return. An advantage of the IRR is that the rate is based on actual events that have occurred and not 
management expectations, which cannot be verified. Over the period during which firms were suffering substantial 
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losses in their pension plan investments (2001 and 2002 ─ a 7 and 8 year IRR, respectively), the long run IRR was 
10.03% (2001) and 8.01% (2002). It appears that, over the long run, firms’ actual rates of return on pension plan 
assets are close to their expected rates of return, but that in 2002, as the market losses get impounded into the actual 




Analysis of Mean Expected Rates of Return Against Mean Actual Return Benchmarks 
 
Panel A: Chart of Returns 
 
 
Panel B: Table of Return Values 
 
Year Simple Average Actual Rate of Return Average Internal Rate of Return Expected Rate of  Return 
1995 16.54 17.39 8.84 
1996 11.27 14.63 8.85 
1997 15.66 15.30 8.92 
1998 10.94 14.32 8.92 
1999 11.86 13.95 8.95 
2000 4.93 12.50 9.00 
2001 -5.73 10.03 8.98 
2002 -8.69 8.01 8.67 
2003 13.98 8.71 8.43 
2004 10.27 8.98 8.32 
2005 8.54 8.98 8.24 
2006 10.57 9.14 8.14 
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 To examine the extent of compliance of firms within our sample, we performed a number of more detailed 
tests. Table 4 presents the distribution of firms’ internal rates of return by decile. For each decile, we determine the 
average expected rate of return (ERR) for the firms within that decile. For firms in the lowest decile, the average 
IRR was under 4.62% each year, yet the average expected rate was 8% or higher each year until 2006, when it was 
7.96%. Beginning in 2001, the number of deciles having lower IRRs than expected rates begins to increase. By 
2002, the average expected return for the first six deciles have lower long-run internal rates of return than expected 




Analysis of Distribution of Internal Rates of Return by Decile 







IRR% Avg ERR% 
Avg 





1st  Decile -0.95 8.67 1.18 8.60 1.95 8.64 2.88 8.41 
2nd Decile 8.81 8.67 9.87 8.69 10.48 8.68 10.34 8.82 
3rd Decile 13.15 8.82 12.23 8.82 13.34 8.80 12.53 8.76 
4th Decile 16.11 8.82 13.93 8.67 14.94 8.93 13.55 9.05 
5th Decile 18.27 8.77 15.19 8.92 16.22 8.82 14.83 8.91 
6th Decile 19.88 8.73 16.41 8.86 17.08 8.99 15.71 9.15 
7th Decile 21.46 9.02 17.31 9.04 17.86 8.93 16.52 8.89 
8th Decile 23.09 8.79 18.19 9.05 18.54 9.28 17.44 9.08 
9th Decile 24.64 8.97 19.31 8.89 19.65 9.11 18.27 9.15 
10th Decile 28.99 9.08 22.38 8.88 22.58 8.99 20.89 9.01 
Correl Coeff  .765  .754  .772  .859 
 


















1st  Decile 4.34 8.48 4.49 8.56 2.61 8.84 1.98 8.52 
2nd Decile 10.16 8.82 9.30 8.82 7.11 8.77 4.99 8.52 
3rd Decile 12.04 9.02 10.91 8.80 8.41 8.80 6.22 8.29 
4th Decile 13.08 8.78 11.94 8.89 9.29 8.77 7.09 8.59 
5th Decile 14.23 9.09 12.67 9.06 10.20 9.01 7.91 8.86 
6th Decile 14.99 9.11 13.38 9.23 10.86 9.09 8.56 8.71 
7th Decile 15.69 8.98 14.06 9.09 11.48 9.13 9.25 8.85 
8th Decile 16.71 9.13 14.72 9.25 12.13 9.25 9.98 8.87 
9th Decile 17.69 8.94 15.57 9.13 12.81 9.17 10.80 8.66 
10th Decile 20.28 9.21 17.75 9.20 15.40 9.01 13.15 8.74 
Correl Coeff  .859  .909  .645  .588 
 


















1st  Decile 3.29 8.24 4.16 8.10 4.36 8.06 4.62 7.96 
2nd Decile 6.07 8.22 6.66 8.12 6.94 8.19 7.20 8.09 
3rd Decile 7.18 8.44 7.59 8.28 7.66 8.13 7.96 8.05 
4th Decile 7.95 8.39 8.22 8.30 8.31 8.20 8.54 8.10 
5th Decile 8.64 8.32 8.90 8.25 8.91 8.21 9.10 8.19 
6th Decile 9.28 8.44 9.43 8.43 9.39 8.32 9.55 8.07 
7th Decile 9.83 8.49 9.92 8.41 9.87 8.35 9.98 8.27 
8th Decile 10.50 8.54 10.52 8.49 10.39 8.40 10.52 8.23 
9th Decile 11.24 8.53 11.10 8.45 10.99 8.42 11.08 8.39 
10th Decile 13.48 8.47 13.07 8.30 12.83 8.23 12.70 8.15 
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Descriptively, it appears that firms generally have actual returns on their pension assets in line with their 
expected returns, but that market conditions deteriorated so much by 2002 that in that year, the majority of firms had 
expected rates of return that overstated their long-run experience. This fact may explain why we observe a large 
jump in the number of firms changing their expected rates of return after 2001 (Table1); the data also suggest, 
however, that the observable reductions may not have been quite enough for a large number of firms since Table 4 
indicates that 40% of the firms still had long-run internal rates of return lower than expected returns in both 2003 
and 2004, and 30% of the firms had lower long-run IRRs in 2005 and 2006 than their reported expected rates of 
return.  
 
Underscoring this observation, the correlation between the average IRR and ERR for the deciles increases 
each year from 1995 until 2000, when it reaches .91.
16
  The correlation drops to only .645 in 2001 and .588 in 2002. 
The correlation improves for 2003 - 2006, but does not approach the values for 1998 – 2000. The evidence suggests 
that prior to 2001, there was a relatively strong correlation between the magnitude of actual returns and the 
magnitude of the expected rates. Generally speaking, firms with higher internal rates of return set higher expected 





Analysis of the Relationship Between Internal Rates of Return and Expected Rates of Return 
Panel A: Number and percent of firms with Cumulative IRRs Less than Expected Rates of Return 
Year Num of Firms % of Firms 
1995 74 15.35% 
1996 55 11.41% 
1997 50 10.37% 
1998 51 10.58% 
1999 45 9.34% 
2000 60 12.45% 
2001 148 30.83% 
2002 272 57.51% 
2003 188 41.05% 
2004 142 34.38% 
2005 130 32.58% 
2006 100 27.17% 
 
Panel B: Number of Years Expected Rate of Return is Greater than Cumulative IRR  
Num of Years ERR>Cum IRR Num of Firms % of Firms 
0 183 37.27% 
1 91 18.53% 
2 36 7.33% 
3 25 5.09% 
4 21 4.28% 
5 31 6.31% 
6 38 7.74% 
7 15 3.05% 
8 17 3.46% 
9 5 1.02% 
10 9 1.83% 
11 6 1.22% 
12 14 2.85% 




                                                 
16 The increase in correlation coefficients from 1995-2000 may be due to the fact that the IRR calculation includes successively 
more years, and thus becomes a better measure of the long-run actual return. 
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 Table 5 (Panel A) examines the number and percent of firms having internal rates of return lower than 
expected rates of return for each year. For the four-year period 1996–1999, the percentage of firms having internal 
rates of return lower than their expected rates was fairly stable, ranging between 9.3 – 11.4%; that is, from 45 to 55 
firms each year had internal rates of return than did not necessarily justify the higher expected rates. In 2000, the 
number (percent) of firms in this condition begins to increase: 60 (12.5%) in 2000, 148 (30.83%) in 2001, and 272 
(57.5%) in 2002. In 2003, the number (percent) of firms in this condition drops to 188 (41.1%), and then declines to 
100 (27.17%) by 2006. These data indicate that a fairly large sub-sample of our firms (up to 58%) found themselves 
in the position of having internal rates of return lower than expected rates of return on pension assets at least once 
during our test period. If a firm’s IRR fell beneath its expected return only once or twice during the period, then it is 
likely that its expected return remains a reasonable assumption. On the other hand, if a firm had annual IRRs that 
were rarely equal to its expected rate of return during the test period, then it seems likely that their expected rates 
were not justified by their long-run actual returns. Panel B of Table 5 provides this data.  
 
Panel B indicates that 14 firms (2.85%) had lower internal rates of return on pension assets than expected 
rates all twelve periods. Combining all the firms whose actual returns were lower than their expected returns for six 
or more years, we find that approximately 21.2% (104) of the sample firms were in this condition. 135 (27.5%) 
firms had expected rates of return greater than their internal rates of return on pension assets would justify for five or 
more years. On the other hand, 356 firms (72.5%) had expected rates of return greater than their internal rates of 
return for four (or fewer) of the 12 periods. On this basis, their internal rates of return justified the expected rate of 




 The pension rate estimates that firms use to determine pension expense and liability amounts are important 
because they have a material impact not only on the pension disclosures, but because they may also indirectly 
impact the income statement and balance sheets of the firm. Articles in the popular business press periodically allege 
that management uses these rates to influence reported earnings, or to reduce liability exposure, or to affect pension 
funding amounts or metrics.  This paper examines the estimates firms use to account for their pension plans and 
compares both the discount rate and expected rate of return to benchmarks based on the authoritative literature and 
economic theory.  
 
 The results suggest that firms’ discount rates correspond most closely to a benchmark consisting of the 
rates on a portfolio of high quality, corporate bonds rather than rates published by the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation or by rates on 20-year treasury bills. Discount rates tend to track corporate bond rates closely, but we 
found that they are usually higher than contemporaneous bond rates. In all but two periods (1994 & 1999), discount 
rates were significantly higher than benchmark rates. In addition, changes in discount rates were smaller than 
changes in corporate rates, suggesting that the discount rates, while revised in compliance with SFAS 87, are revised 
in a manner that reduces the volatility inherent in corporate bond rates, and thus have a smoothing impact on 
reported pension amounts. Interestingly, we also found that when corporate bond rates fell, corresponding discount 
rate changes (declines) were lower than when corporate bond rates rose. Finally, we found that during 2001 and 
2002, both corporate rates and discount rates declined, but in both periods, discount rates declined much less than 
corporate rates declined. This evidence suggests that managers revised their rates according to the requirements of 
SFAS 87, but that the revisions are smoother than revisions which might be appropriate based on a stricter 
adherence to the benchmark. It also appears that managers were affected by the poor economic conditions prevailing 
from 2001–2002 and were hesitant to revise discount rates downward as much as the economic conditions 
warranted. 
 
 Results of our expected rate of return analysis indicate that, on average, actual long-run returns seem to 
justify the use of the expected rates of return we observe. This is particularly true prior to 2002. In 2002, average 
IRRs fell beneath average expected returns, so expected rates were be slightly higher than historical long-run returns 
would support. In addition, we found that during the recessionary years of 2001 and 2002, the number of firms 
whose expected returns were higher than their long-run IRRs increased to close to 60% of our sample. Finally, we 
observed a large minority of firms (about 27%) reporting expected rates of return that were not supported or justified 
by their internal rates of return.  
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 Since we studied managers’ pension rate choices over a relatively extended time frame, our findings may 
prove useful to the FASB as it considers the second phase of its current pension project. We have provided some 
evidence that while pension rates generally reflect benchmarks, they tend to have a smoothing effect relative to 
benchmarks and also tend to lag benchmark adjustments during extreme economic downturns. Our findings lend 
support to the requirement in SFAS 132R to provide a narrative description of the reasonableness and basis for the 
expected rate of return assumption, and also suggest that the Board’s consideration of sensitivity analysis for 
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